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The objective set before us in this work is to explore the
direction which social science has taken in this century. We do
not intend to focus our attention on the nature and occurrence
of phenomena, for these empirical notations are important only
if one wants them to be. Furthermore, they are not relevant to
science. The goal here is to simply distinguish, using a few isolated
examples, between science and empiricism.
There seems to be remarkable confusion as to the distinc-
tion between science and empiricism. We must note that this
confusion is not new.
In ancient times there was no social science. What we call social
science was then called social philosophy or political philosophy
or ethics. Aristotle's political and ethical philosophy, for ex-
ample, was the same as his social science. It was much latter,
with the success of Newtonian science, that social thinkers felt
_t1)~t it was .possible to cr~a~e. a J!lQd~r~ social ~si.en.ce. ~~i!iU to ,-. ~
the modern natural sciences. This modern or positivistic social
science would have one basic characteristic, it was thought: it
would be scientific (Stern, p. 1).
It was thought, and believed, that this "scientific" approach
along with the statements derived thereof could introduce the
capability of interpersonal agreement. The worth of this notion is
sound, in that it is consistent with the function of science and
reflects an adequate goal of the social sciences. However, along
the path from social inquiry to social science, a reversal of the
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stated intention has occurred. It will suffice to say that the dis-
cipline of sociology has advanced in a circular fashion, and that
modern empiricists are nowhere closer to the scientific approach
than they were three hundred years ago. Quite simply, they have
increased their efforts only to lose sight of their goal. In essence,
science has been put at bay for the sake of empiricism.
The task before us is to set down this scientific approach in
the Galilean tradition, and to critically analyze the essential
stance of two important authors in the social sciences; Karl
Pearson and Sir Ronald Fisher. Although this task is fragmented
and isolates only a few examples, it provides an intellectual
impetus for detailed analysis.
The point of reference for this paper is the conception of
exact science implicit in the work of Galileo Galilei's Dialog Con-
cerning Two New Sciences. The work here cited is more than a
mere discourse of Mechanica (statics) and Movimenti Locali
(dynamics) but rather is a prescription for theory and methods
in the scientific enterprise. .
Three issues are isolated in this paper, for they seem to mark
(account for) much of the divergence of Pearson and Fisher from
exact science. They are abstraction, modeling, and rigidity. Each
of these concepts have been misused or ignored in the sociologi-
cal endeavor (theory and research) whUe they have been fun-
damental to the exact sciences.
Galilee knew what abstraction meant. Furthermore, he '
understood the difference between the abstract and the con-·
crete. The distinction here is actually quite elementary if we
...consider the following:
... I .. . call to your attention the fact that these forces, resist
every movements, figures, etc., may be considered either in the
abstract, dissociated from matter, or in the concrete, associated
with matter. Hence the properties which belong to figures that
are merely geometrical and non-material must be modified
when we fill these figures with matter ..." (Galileo, P: 112).
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Notice the bent to Galileo's perspective. It implies that pheno-
me?a (physical and social) has, or can have, an abstract represen-
ration for studying it in the purest sense. It also indicates that
modifications take place after abstraction.
Only w~th a conception of abstraction, can a modeling
proced~re (WIth laws and principles) be presented. It should be
emphasized that this modeling procedure, as an interpreted geo-
m~try, must be a wholly and totally abstract representation. To
this extent, a modeling procedure indicates the order of pheno-
mena and not the opposite. "... the phenomena to be investi-
gated is modeled and subsummed by the calculus ... such that a
dynamic picture is generated. This formulation then guides the
whole o~ the experimental process..." (Willer, p. 3).
. ThIS statem~nt, as a theoretical and methodological guide,
IS well gr?unded In.the work of Galileo. As one example, " ... we
are confirmed mainly by the consideration that experimental
results are seen to agree with and exactly correspond with those
properties w~ich have been ... demonstrated by us" (Galileo,
p. 160). That IS, we have demonstrated it first!
By ~his we c~ s~~ that abs~raction is the necessary process
from which the scientific enterprIse proceeds. It is central to the
work of Galileo and it is absent (for the most part) in social
science.
We must also consider the most misunderstood term in
social science today; that of rigidity (or rigor). When Galileo
state.s "I propose to demonstrate in a rigid manner," he means
precisely that he will define what is included in properties and
.. p.roc;~clQres_alJ.q. ..what willbe ignored. In conjunction with abstrac-
non and modeling this rigor is practiced in the exact sciences.
The work of Galileo has set the premise for scientific achieve-
ment, ye.t t~is direction has been misunderstood or ignored in
the apP~Ication of theory and methods in the social science.
Abstraction do~s. not dominate as the preliminary step in social
theory, as empirical observation has come to the fore. Modeling
procedures do not order anything, but rather are set to the cast
of empirical data. Rigor has been systematized to the point
where uncertainty can be "rigorously" calculated. These attempts
lead away from, and not toward, exact science.
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We need only to turn to Karl Pearson to see how the aim of
science is lost, to a degree, in regard to the science of society.
He had provided a type of systematic empiricism that was not
solely based upon observables but also based upon the prediction
of events based on observables. The observables with which
Pearson is concerned, is human society.
At the very beginning of his work, The Grammar of Science,
Pearson states that " ... a change has taken place in our apprecia-
tion of the essential facts in the growth of human society,"
(Pearson, P: 1) thus entrenching the need for scientific explora-
tion of the human entity. This, in itself, is a noble task (although
not an original one) and is deserving of some commendation.
But, however clear the task may be, the "methods" lack severely.
Consider the following statement (in a Weberian sense if you
choose) with respect to its honesty and intent. "The scientific
man has above all things to strive at self-elimination in his judge-
ments, to provide an argument which is as true for each indivi-
dual mind as for his own" (Pearson, P: 11). This statement is in :i:~:,~~~t;~~~j~~:··
reference to the role of science in society (citizenship) and taken ...;';{~.<'.:,"~a-~;f.:~~~
by itself (the "self elimination of judgements" concept) is in
agreement with a scientific endeavor. But consider this "method"
now in relation to how unscientific the perspective truly is..:;: .."...._,.~,.-'" ..~;~~~';,
"The classification of facts, the recognition of their sequence
and relative significance is the function of science" (Pearson,
P: 11). The observant reader of Karl Pearson would realize that _~:',,";::~:;;!.'':~:-~1i:ilFIZ':'
these "facts" of which he writes so reverently are r"t.kC'Q11"-':7".klt:"'~
or at best they are based on observables. Systematic empiricism ~,~::;.":,<,:,:,:,,;~~':"
thus oper·afes·undeLthe guh"'C of Sd-eLice..for Pearson.
If the reader interprets Pearson to be thoroughly misled
(wrong) in his conception of science, it is just as easy to believe
that he (Pearson) is thoroughly confused instead; for Pearson
does display that he might know what science is. "The discovery
of Law (scientific law) is the peculiar function of the ereanve
imagination"(Pearson, P: 32). This statement does not
Pearson from science in an inportant sense, but subsequent
mentary does. The initial reaction is that Pearson has, after
an understanding of abstraction, as this misconception is
supported: "The statement of this formula was not so much
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By the time Sir Ronald Aylmer Fisher had completed The
Design of Experiments, systematic empiricis~ had" beco~e
thoroughly confused with (and mislabeled) s~Ience. The ~IS­
tory ... of systematic empiricism in sociology IS ~o~cerned ';Ith
the development of systematic methods of aSSOCIatIon, relation,
and induction and was completed when Fisher provided a method
of association by significance tests" (Willer, p. 16). ..
To most empiricists, the procedures and practicality of
designing research has come to the foregr~und. The concern. is
with setting up and evaluating research designs rather tha~ WIth
the logical process of going from "association to .relation to
induction to produce an empirical generalization" (Wil!er, p. 61).
What has evolved is not the "rigid" process that Galileo speaks
of, but rather a "rigid" process whereby uncertainty is calculated
rigorously. "We may at once admit that any .inference from the
particular to the general must be attended WIth ~ome degree of
uncertainty, but this is not the same as to admit that such ~
inference cannot be absolutely rigorous" (Fisher, p. 4). ThIS
statement prescribes nothing more than a rigorous calculation
of uncertainty. Furthermore, any induction at this point has no
promise (mathematical or theoretical) from which to proceed.
In his calculation of uncertainty Fisher has adopted the
normality assumption and in effect uses the equation for t~e
normal curve along with measures of central tendency and dIS-
persion. The resulting error terms are applied statistically to
associations.
.. . estimates may be made, which .~,~hemselves contain the
whole of the information available for finite samples. These
especially valuable and comprehensive estimates are called suffi-
cient statistics, and the great simplicity of problems, which fall
under the head of theory of errors, is due to the fact that with
the normal distribution both the quantities requiring estimation,
the mean, and the variance, posess sufficient estimates. It is for
this reason that in so much experimental work we need only be
concerned with the precision of the total, or mean, of the values
observed, and with the estimation of this precision from the
sum of squares of the residual deviations (Fisher, p. 248).
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The implications of this are surely complex in mathematical
form. But this is where complex mathematical formulation is
muddled with the elements of science. The above statement does
not involve a theoretic calculus based on an abstract model. It is
based on observed error terms (deviation) or probablistic error
terms resting on the. binomial expansion. It (itself) is precise,
but only to the extent that it is a precise measure of non-deter-
mination.
.Furthermo~:, Fisher's method assumes the interpretations ofclasslc~ probabih~y theory (based on a-priori assumptions) while
employing a rela~lve freque.nc! model (an a-posteriori approach).
The effects of rhis, contradlctlOn not withstanding, are misleading
to the extent that the sum of squares principle cannot be attended
to in any predictive sense. Yet Fisher's approach rests on it and is
commonly called "scientific."
. A. further comment must be made in light of the foregoingd~cusslon. Although the analysis of variance technique is a test ofdIf~erence in means, it is based upon the comparison of variances.T~lS further aborts scientific modeling procedure by leaving cer-
tam values "free to vary."
, 7o.Fisher, testing a null hypothesis was simply a matter of
distribution and randomness. His purpose was with the deter-
minatio~ of rand,o~y distributed differences and had very little
to do WIth associanon. In effect, a test of a random distribution
is a test of the. d~ta inc!usive of that distribution. It is not truly
a, test of ~ssocIatlOn. FIsher extends the application beyond a
simple affrrmation of distribution and randomness to that of
.. as~~c~atio~.. What he. has come up with, in reality, is a false. faith
in randomness.
Having decided that · . , our estimates of the error of the average
difference must be based upon the discrepancies between the
differences actually observed, we must next inquire what pre-
cautions are needed in the practical conduct of the experiment
to guarantee that such an estimate shall be a valid one ....
Randomization properly carried out ... ensures that the esti-
mates of error will take proper care of all [differencesJ, and
relieves the experimenter from the anxiety of considering and
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Carter, Naboodiri and Blalock state an interesting corrolary
to this.
estimating the magnitude of the innumerable causes by which
his data may be disturbed (see Fisher, p. 46-50).
"What is Exact Theory?" Research paper presented to the
National Science Foundation.
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The commentary to this is that analysts should avoid random
arrangements which are clearly patterned. If this is so, then the
concepts of randomization is valid only to the extent that it
reflects a-posteriori probability assumptions. Beyond this point,
randomness is discarded. This is not science-it does not even
resemble scientific procedures. It surely is systematic, but such
a badge is not "holy" enough for persons of this discipline to
wear.
On the basis of what has been written here it seems clear
(even in so few examples) that Fisher and his method are not
scientific. Fisher does not mention abstraction, and his "models"
(experimental designs) are applied to mathematics as if they and ./~:i{;"£<~'_':~<ilIi!'i,­
their mathematical formulations had some meaning scientifically.
They do not. -;.:":'~'a!~::~;T::~.
We must make it clear that this paper is not intended
simply point out the weaknesses of Pearson and Fisher. Nor is
an attack -OIL systematic empiricism. It is an explanation, illus- ."""'''''':'~;-;~C'
trated through Pearson and Fisher, that systematic
is not science, and that the scientific tradition in sociology needs :-;·-·;;;;~·;·:{t;:.~~m~.
redirection. An understanding of Galileo and Einstein would. ·;?::~:~8W'f.I~F:
provide an excellent starting point. Furthermore, this paper is ..~.;,,: .. ;;.;':',,"gy......
not intended to be "anti-empiricism." It is intended to show only ,;".',,"""':'~p'••
that there is a difference between science and empiricism, and
that this difference should be understood and given proper re- ._.-<-"~~:<.,,..,..z,
cognition.
Sir Ronald Fisher ... was once asked: What would you do if,
drawing a Latin square at random for an experiment, you hap-
paned to draw a Knut Vit square? Fisher remarked that he would
discard the selection and draw again ..." (Carter et al., p. 13).
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